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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JANET R. COX,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
-vs-

Case No.

K. NORMAN COX,

92-0818
Trial Court No. 904402060

Defendant/Appellee.

Priority Classification 15

BRIEF OP APPELLANT
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "plaintiff" or
"wife") and submits the following as her Brief of Appellant in the
above-captioned case:

JURXSPTCTIQNAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to review the final order and judgment herein,
which is a Decree of Divorce, is vested in the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules
3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(i).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The matter below is a divorce proceeding, and the order
appealed from is a Decree of Divorce.

STATEMENT Of THE ISSffBS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1*

Did

the

trial

distribution in this case?
a.

Did

the

court

err

in

making

its

property

Specifically:
trial

court

err

in

awarding

the

defendant/husband all his premarital assets, together with
the vast majority of the marital assets of the parties?
b.

Did the trial court err in refusing to compensate

the plaintiff

for the fact that she had co-mingled and

expended her premarital assets during the parties' marriage?
c.

Did the trial court err in failing to compensate

plaintiff for an interest in the real property?
d.

Did the trial court err in ordering plaintiff to

pay defendant's attorney's fees?
2.

Did the trial court err in failing to award either

rehabilitative or permanent alimony to the plaintiff?
3,

Did the trial court err in the manner in which it

interpreted the prenuptial contract entered between the parties?

PETERHIHATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AWP RULES
There

is no case law authority

nor statutory

authority

believed by the defendant to be wholly dispositive of the issues
raised on appeal.

2

STANPARP QP mVlW
The standard of review on appeal is an abuse of discretion
standard as to all issues.

The trial court should have broad

discretion in domestic relations matters, and so long as that
discretion is exercised within the confines of the proper legal
standards set by the appellate courts of this state, and so long as
the facts and reasons for the decision are set forth fully in
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court
should not disturb the resulting order*
This court should review the factual findings of the trial
judge under the "clearly erroneous11 standard.

A finding is

"clearly erroneous" when "although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Ut. 1987).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the final judgment and decree of divorce
entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, District Court
Judge presiding, which, among other things, entered an order
regarding property distribution, alimony, attorney's fees, and
interpreting a prenuptial contract of the parties.

3

Wife filed for divorce in the trial court.
pleadings

were

filed

by

defendant/appellee

Responsive

(also hereinafter

"husband") and the matter came on before the lower court, sitting
without a jury, for trial, on August 31, 1992.

The trial court

took the matter under advisement, and issued a memorandum decision,
which was entered September 28, 1992*

The memorandum decision is

attached hereto as appendix lfC.ft
Findings of fact, conclusions of law and The decree of divorce
from which the plaintiff/appellant pursued this appeal were entered
on October 28, 1992.

A true and correct copy of the findings is

attached as appendix "A."

The decree is attached as appendix ,fB.,f

A notice of appeal was filed on behalf of the defendant on November
27, 1992.
A copy is attached as appendix

,f

D.M

There have been no

motions filed pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59,
of the Ut?ih Rtqeg Qf Civil PrpgQflmre,

STATEHMT OF THE FACTS
The parties to the above-captioned matter were previously
husband and wife.

They were married on July 1, 1988.

They were

divorced by a decree of divorce entered on October 28, 1992. The
trial as to all issues was held on August 31, 1992.
The parties do not have any children born as issue of their
marriage. This marriage was the plaintiff's third marriage and the

4

defendant's second.

At the time of their marriage, plaintiff was

forty-seven years old and the defendant was fifty-six years old*
(Findings of Fact 4, R.O.A. 214).

Prior to the date of marriage,

the parties executed a prenuptial contract.

That prenuptial

contract was admitted as exhibit 3 at the time of trial.
and

correct

copy

of

this

exhibit

is

attached

A true

hereto

and

incorporated herein as appendix "E." Page 4 of exhibit 3 recites
that the value of the husband's estate, as of June 28, 1988, was
approximately $380,000.00.

The contract also recites that the

wife's estate, as of June 28, 19a8, was valued at $70,000.00.
There is no itemization of the parties' assets in exhibit 3.
In 1966, husband built a house at 773 South 400 East in Orem,
Utah. He paid a mortgage on the property in full. At the time of
the parties' marriage in 1988, the property was unencumbered.
(Findings of Fact 5, R.O.A. 214).
Prior to the parties' marriage, the wife also owned a
residence.

She sold her separate residence prior to the parties'

marriage, and received $21,000.00 as proceeds from that sale. From
that $21,000.00, the wife repaid her parents $18,000.00 she had
borrowed from them to purchase her residence in the first place.
(Findings of Fact 6, R.O.A. 213).
Contemporaneous with the execution of the parties' antenuptial
agreement, the husband executed a warranty deed granting the wife
5

a joint interest in his premarital home.

(Findings of Fact 9,

R.O.A. 211# 212). A true and correct copy of the warranty deed in
issue was admitted at trial as exhibit 4.
hereto as appendix "P."

A copy is attached

This warranty deed was dated June 29,

1988/ one day before the husband executed the antenuptial agreement
on June 30, 1988*
The value of the husband's home prior to this marriage and
prior to remodeling was $77,000.00.

The wife expended $18,062.65

for remodeling of the husband's premarital home.

Of this sum,

$9/005.55 was expended by plaintiff prior to the execution of the
antenuptial agreement. The plaintiff received "reimbursement" from
the defendant during the marriage of $5,500.00 for a part of this
sum.

Therefore, plaintiff expended a net sum of $12,562.65 for

remodeling the husband's premarital home.
$11,931.00 for remodeling the home.
210, 211).

The defendant spent

(Findings of Fact 12, R.O.A.

The trial court has failed to find whether the

defendant expended his money on the remodeling of his premarital
home before or after the execution of the premarital contract,
and/or before or after the parties' marriage. The trial court also
failed to make a finding about the source of finds for this
expenditure.
The court found that the fair market value of defendant's
premarital

home

at the

time of the
6

parties' separation was

$105,000.00. (Findings of Fact 13, R.O.A. 212). The court did not
value the home as of the date of divorce.
The trial court found (and plaintiff disputes the finding)
that defendant's premarital home did not increase in value as a
result of plaintiff's remodeling expenditures*

The lower court

found that the value of defendant's premarital home in 1988, plus
the amount of the money the parties had paid jointly toward the
remodeling, totalled $106,993.65, exceeding the $105,000.00 fair
market value by $1,993.65.

(Findings of Fact 13, R.O.A. 211).

The trial court found that both parties liquidated their
separate assets and "invested them in the marriage."
this

means

that

assets

were

expended

during

(Apparently

the marriage.)

(Findings of Fact 14, R.O.A. 211). The trial court specifically
found that plaintiff had expended $74,000.00 during the marriage,
$30,000.00 of that sum to her children.

The court found that the

defendant had expended $109,114.45 during the marriage.

In other

words, plaintiff expended all of her premarital assets, and a few
thousand dollars more, during the course of the parties' marriage.
The defendant expended less than one-third of his premarital assets
during the parties' marriage.
The court found the plaintiff's gross monthly income to be
$1,850.00, and her "net worth" to be $10,539.00. (Findings of Fact
15 and 19, R.O.A. 209, 210). The court found the defendant's net
7

worth at the time of separation to be $232,249*00, and his gross
monthly income to be $554*00 per month.

(Findings of Fact 15 and

19, R.O.A. 209, 210).
The trial court awarded husband all right, title and interest
in the home in Orem, Utah. (Decree of Divorce, paragraph 7, R.O.A.
217).

Plaintiff was awarded her pre-marriage and post-marriage

remodeling expenditures, in the sura of $12,562.65.
Divorce, paragraph 5, R.O.A. 218).
lien

interest

(Decree of

Plaintiff was not granted a

in the residence, nor a

judgment against the

defendant for this sum.
The wife was ordered to pay some of defendant's attorney's
fees, totalling $4,649.00.

(Decree of Divorce, paragraph 10,

R.O.A. 217).
The plaintiff was not awarded any alimony from the defendant.
(Decree of Divorce, paragraph 9, R.O.A. 217).
From this final judgment and order of the court, the plaintiff
filed a timely appeal.

(R.O.A. 231).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's finding that the husband's income was in the
total sum of $554.00 per month was a clearly erroneous finding.
The evidence at trial supports a conclusion that the defendant's
income far exceeded this amount.
8

Based upon the incomes of the parties, the disparity in their
assets, and the disparity in their circumstances the court erred in
failing to award the plaintiff alimony.
The trial court erred in failing to find that the plaintiff
had an interest in the Orem residence, and in failing to award her
one-half the total value of that residence.
The trial court erred in awarding the defendant attorney's
fees, based upon the disparity in the parties' assets, and the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's claims made at trial*

POINT I:

A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AWARD PLAINTIFF ALIMONY.
The parties' incomes and circumstances were not
properly considered by the court.

As noted above, this Court should review the factual findings
of the trial judge under a "clearly erroneous" standard.

This

Court should find the trial court's factual determinations to be
"clearly erroneous" where, although there is some evidence to
support the trial court's conclusions, the reviewing court "on the
entire evidence is left the definite and firm
mistake has been committed."

conviction that a

State v. Walkerf supra.
9

Plaintiff is mindful of her obligation to this court to
martial

the

evidence

regarding

the

parties'

respective

circumstances, and to demonstrate, once the evidence has been
marshalled, that it fails to pass the "clearly erroneous" standard.
All of the evidence presented at trial regarding the parties'
respective incomes came from the parties themselves.

The wife

testified that she was employed during the marriage as a secretary
in

the

management-communication

University.

department

(Tr. p.30, 11.3-7).

at

Brigham

Young

Her income at the time of the

marriage was $1,008.58, net per month.

(Tr. p.30, 11.8-12).

In addition, during the marriage, the plaintiff received
social security for her son from a previous marriage. She received
a total of $6,400.00 from this source during the marriage.

Of

this, approximately half was paid directly to her son, and half was
spent on marital expenses for these parties.

(Tr. p.31, 11.2-24).

At the commencement of the marriage, the plaintiff had some
investment income, but the investments were liquidated during the
marriage. She also received a lump sum of approximately $32,000.00
from the liquidation of a contract on Oregon real property, which
was disbursed, with

agreement

from the defendant,

partly to

plaintiff's children, and partly for marital obligations of this
marriage.

(Tr. p.32, 1.223).

had only her monthly income.

As of the date of trial, the wife
She had no other source of income,
10

either from investment or contract receivables, such as she had
enjoyed at the date of marriage.

(Tr. p.46, 11•2-11).

As of the time of trial, the wife was earning inadequate
income to meet her monthly living expenses*

She was receiving

monthly assistance from her church to pay the mortgage for her new
residence, and was receiving food assistance from her church. (Tr.
p.43, 1.13 through p.44, 1.5; p.46, 1.22 through p.47, 1.4).
Plaintiff requested assistance from the defendant, in the form
of alimony at the rate of $250.00 per month, for a period of three
years, in order to pursue an education to improve her income. (Tr.
p.55, 11.2-10).
The defendant testified that his monthly earnings in 1990,
were in the sum of $1,400.00 per month.

(Tr. p. 159, 11.2-7) •

Prior to and during the parties' marriage, defendant owned a
business, Ward's Body Shop.
As

of

trial,

(Tr. p.158, 11.21-24).

defendant

received

$558.00

per

month

in

unemployment benefits. He testified he was seeking employment, but
had not been "called" on any job applications.

(Tr. p.159, 11.8-

21).
Defendant testified that he has "bad knees," which prevented
him from performing auto body work at Ward's Body Shop.
p.169, ll.15-p.170, 1.5).

(Tr.

Other than this testimony, no other

evidence was adduced regarding defendant's "disability." Defendant
11

produced no medical report, nor the testimony of any health care
provider, regarding his ability to obtain employment.
The law in the state of Utah requires that a person be
actively seeking employment and able to accept employment, in order
to receive unemployment compensation. It should be assumed by this
Court that, if the defendant qualified to receive unemployment
compensation, he was capable of employment. His historical income,
by his own testimony, was $1,400.00 per month.

(The defendant did

not testify, and the court did not make a finding, whether this was
net or gross income.)
Based upon all of this evidence, and upon a lack of evidence
as to the defendant's "medical disability," the lower court's
finding that defendant's income was $558.00 per month, is clearly
erroneous.

B.

The trial court should have assessed the defendant
for alimony under the circumstances of this case.

As noted in the previous point of argument, the trial court
should have attributed income to the defendant in excess of the
amount of his monthly unemployment compensation. The court should
have found that the parties' incomes were approximately equal.
Further, the court should have found that other circumstances of
the parties, beyond a mere consideration of income, warranted an
12

order for alimony.
The trial court, in making a determination regarding an award
of alimony, must consider the potential obligor's ability to pay
alimony, the potential obligee's ability to provide support for
herself, and the needs of the potential obligee.

Jones v. Jones.

700 P.2d, 1072 (Ut. 1985).
The trial court found the third prong of this test to be
satisfied, in that the court found the defendant did not and could
not earn adequate income to support herself.

(See the memorandum

decision, R.O.A. 202).
The second prong of the Jones test is satisfied. Clearly, if
the obligee had a need for alimony, and she was already employed
full-time, then she did not have an ability to support herself.
The only remaining factor for consideration is the ability of
the obligor to provide support.

In this case, the trial court

limited its consideration as to this factor to the issue of
defendant's
"disability."

current

income,

and

The court below

defendant's

unsubstantiated

fails to consider

the other

components making up the defendant's financial circumstances.

In

making its determination regarding alimony, the trial court fails
to consider that the defendant had a home valued at $105,000.00,
virtually free of encumbrance.

On the other hand, the plaintiff

would not have had a home but for her parents' willingness to buy
13

a home and permit her to occupy the home, and the willingness of
her church to pay the mortgage on that residence.
The trial court failed to consider that the defendant enjoyed
a total net worth in excess of $230,000.00, while the plaintiff's
net worth was slightly more than $10,000.00, and comprised entirely
of a retirement plan which she could not access without substantial
penalty.
The defendant might argue that such an order of alimony would
have the effect of requiring the defendant to pay alimony out of
his premarital

property.

This would

consideration for this Court to make.

not be an appropriate

This Court has previously

held in Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d, 616 (Ut. App. 1988), that
an award of alimony may be entered which necessitates that alimony
be paid out of premarital property.

In the Sampinos case, this

Court of Appeals approved an alimony award which required that the
alimony be paid out of coal contract proceeds which were determined
to be the obligor's sole and separate property.
Under all of the circumstances here, it was error for the
trial court to fail to award alimony to the plaintiff.

The matter

should be remanded to the trial court for imposition of an award of
alimony, and

findings

of

fact

as to the

permanent versus rehabilitative alimony.

14

appropriateness of

POINT II • THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF ONE-HALF
THE OREM RESIDENCE.

Plaintiff concedes that defendant owned the Orem residence in
issue for a substantial period of time prior to the parties'
marriage.

Ordinarily, pursuant to the laws of the state of Utah,

the defendant would be entitled to receive the home as his
premarital

property, free and clear of any

interest of the

plaintiff.
However, in the instant case, the circumstances which occurred
immediately before and during the marriage of the parties are such
that the plaintiff acquired a legal interest in an equitable
interest in the Orem residence. This property interest should have
been divided equally between the parties, as of the date of the
divorce.
Approximately two days before the parties' marriage, and one
day before he executed the antenuptial contract, the defendant
conveyed the property in question to the parties, jointly, as joint
tenants, by means of a warranty deed.

Plaintiff expended over

$9,000.00 in the remodeling of the home, in the months immediately
prior to the marriage, and over $9,000,00 in remodeling the home
after

the

marriage.

It

is

irrelevant

that

the

defendant

"reimbursed* the plaintiff $5,500.00 during their marriage.
15

A

financial conveyance of this sort between husband and wife during
a marriage does not and should not alter the nature and extent of
the marital estate*
The defendant also contributed a substantial sum of money to
the remodeling of the residence. The trial court found that he had
paid $11,931.00 for the remodeling.

It is a reasonable inference

that he paid this sum out of income earned during the marriage,
since defendant was employed during the marriage. The court makes
no finding to the contrary.

If defendant paid these funds out of

earned income, then these funds arer also a marital asset.
The parties lived together in the home as husband and wife.
The home appreciated in value from its 1988 fair market value of
$77,000.00 to its value of $105,000.00 on the date of separation.
The trial court has made a finding that the increase in the
value of the Orem residence was not a result of the plaintiff's
remodeling

expenditures.

This

finding

is plain error.

An

application of simple arithmetic to the problem indicates that the
1988, $77,000.00 value, added to the plaintiff's total remodeling
expenditures of $18,062.65, and the defendant's total remodeling
expenditures of $11,931.00, totals $106,993.65, or only about
$2,000.00

more

separation.

than

the

fair

market

value

at

the

date

of

There was no evidence from any real estate appraiser,

or any other expert, to show any cause for increase in the value of
16

the home between 1988 and 1992, other than the remodeling paid for
jointly by the parties.
Under these circumstances, it was error for the trial court
simply

to reimburse

plaintiff

for her repair costs, without

interest, and without even any security for these costs awarded,
and to award the home to the defendant.

The court's of this state

have recognized that, though the general rule is that premarital
property may be viewed as the separate property of a party, this is
not binding in all circumstances. In Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 P.2d,
1144 (Ut. App. 1988), the court found that "premarital property"
may be subject to distribution in a divorce case.

The Naranjo

court stated:
. . . A party may be awarded property
which the other spouse brought into the
marriage.
In fashioning an equitable
property division, trial courts must consider
all of the pertinent circumstances, including
the amount and kind of the property to be
divided, the source of the 7property, the
parties' health, the parties standard of
living and respective financial conditions,
their needs and earning capacities, the
duration of the marriage, what the parties
gave up by the marriage and the relationship
the property division has with the amount of
alimony awarded.
In this case, the premarital property was commingled by virtue
of the warranty deed.

Moreover, the plaintiff made substantial

contributions toward improving the value of the residence, both by
paying

for the

expenses

of remodeling,

and

by enduring the

inconvenience of remodeling while it was in progress.

Because of

all these circumstances, she acquired a full title interest in the
home, and should have received half the value thereof at trial.
The defendant may argue that the antenuptial agreement of the
parties mandated that the house be awarded to the defendant as his
sole and separate property.

This is not the case.

To the extent

that the trial court relied upon the antenuptial contract as the
basis to award the home to the defendant, the trial court erred in
interpreting the contract.
The

plaintiff

concedes

that

antenuptial

contracts

are

generally recognized and enforceable in the state of Utah.
. . .In general, pre-nuptial agreements
concerning the disposition of property owned
by the parties at the time of their marriage
are valid so long as their is no fraud,
coercion, or material non-disclosure. Hack
v. Hack. 734 P.2d, 417 (Ut. 1986).
The problem for the defendant with the antenuptial contract
in the case now before the court is the ambiguity contained in the
contract with regard to the defendant's assets.

The contract

purports to provide full disclosure of each party's assets by
listing a total net worth of each party.

The contract fails to

identify with particularity, however, exactly what assets go into
making up that net worth.

There is no specific list of assets

included in or appended to the antenuptial contract. Therefore, it
is impossible to determine whether the defendant disclosed the
18

value of his assets by including or excluding the value of the Orem
home •
The defendant, in apparent contradiction to the antenuptial
contract, executed a warranty deed on the day before he executed
the contract.

The warranty deed vested the plaintiff with an

undivided one-half interest in the Orem home, as a joint tenant
with defendant*

After granting the plaintiff this title interest

in the property, the defendant then signed a contract disclosing
his net worth, without specifying his assets, and agreeing with the
plaintiff that his premarital assets would be awarded to him.
It is clear from this conduct that the defendant intended to
award the plaintiff a title interest in the Orem residence.

He

apparently intended to protect other premarital assets (including
his interest in a cabin in the Ward's Body Shop business) from the
plaintiff in the event of a divorce.

He repented of his decision

to give the plaintiff the Orem home only after it became apparent
that the parties' marriage would not last.
Under all of the circumstances, the court below erred in
failing to award plaintiff her one-half interest in the home.
Further, the home should have been valued as of the date of the
decree, not as of the date of separation.
P.2d, 695 (Ut. 1985).

Beraer v. Berger, 713

The matter should be remanded to enter

judgment awarding plaintiff a one-half interest in the orem home as
19

of October 29, 1992.

POINT III*

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ORDERING THE PLAINTIFF TO PAY
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES.

The trial court ordered that the plaintiff would pay the
defendant's attorney's fees in the sum of $4,649.00.

It is clear

from the record that the determination to award the defendant this
sum in attorney's fees was based upon the plaintiff's failure to
accept the defendant's offer of judgment.
R.O.A.,

121).

(The offer appears at

The trial court's determination was not more

favorable to the plaintiff than the defendant's pretrial offer of
judgment.

(Findings of Fact 21, R.O.A., 209). There is no other

basis for the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the
defendant than the plaintiff's failure to accept the offer of
judgment.
The trial court's ruling misinterprets Rule 68 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 68(b) reads, in pertinent part as

follows:
. . . If the judgment finally obtained
by the offeree is not more favorable than the
offer, the offeree must pay the costs
incurred after the making of the offer. . . .
Rule 68 makes reference to "costs" and not to attorney's fees.
20

The costs provided for in this Rule are limited to taxable costs
only, and do not include attorney's fees.
P.2d, 601 (Ut. 1978).

Nelson v. Newman, 583

Therefore, the trial court committed error

in assessing attorney's fees solely upon the basis of Rule 68.
The trial court had wide latitude, pursuant to its equitable
powers in this divorce proceeding, to award attorney's fees and to
assess costs of trial, including costs which would otherwise be
non-taxable costs. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Ut. App. 1989).
However, a trial court has an obligation to make adequate factual
findings to support this conclusion.

Failure to make adequate

findings on all material issues is reversible error in and of
itself.

Jeffries v. Jeffries. 80 U.A.R., 18 (Ut. App. 1988).

There is absolutely no factual finding of the trial court,
other than the erroneous legal conclusion regarding the offer of
judgment, to support the order that plaintiff pay attorney's fees
to defendant.
This matter should be remanded to the trial court for a
factual determination regarding equitable issues surrounding the
attorney's fees award.
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CQECEUSTON

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the trial court in
this matter should be reversed and remanded for entry of an order
awarding the plaintiff alimony, for entry of an order awarding the
plaintiff one-half interest in the Orem residence, and for entry of
specific findings regarding an appropriate attorney's fees award in
this case.
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees incurred in
pursuing this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

day of June, 1993.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CONCISION

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the trial court in
this matter should be reversed and remanded for entry of an order
awarding the plaintiff alimony, for entry of an order awarding the
plaintiff one-half interest in the Orem residence, and for entry of
specific findings regarding an appropriate attorney's fees award in
this case.
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees incurred in
pursuing this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

//

day of June, 1993.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

•

^

—

MARY/fT CORPORON

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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QgRTIFXCATB Qf H^P-PKTJVfflRY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff/appellant herein, and that
I caused the foregoing BRIEF, to be served upon defendant/appellee
by hand-delivering two true and correct copies of the same in an
envelope addressed to:
BYRON FISHER
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
Twelfth Floor
215 State, P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
on the

/V

day of

J-^A n &

;

23

t

1993.

qgPTXFICATg OF HAWP-pgkSVPRY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
& Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff/appellant herein, and that
I caused the foregoing BRIEF, to be served upon defendant/appellee
by hand-delivering two true and correct copies of the same in an
envelope addressed to:
BYRON FISHER
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
Twelfth Floor
215 State, P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
on the

day of

, 1993.
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MARILYN MOODY BROWN, ESQ. #4803
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
RICHARD L. PEEL, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar #4359
228 S. Fourth Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Telephone: (702) 382-0711
Attorneys for Defendant K. NORMAN COX
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANET R. COX,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 904402060
K. NORMAN COX,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court for trial on August 31,
1992.

Plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H.

Weight, Esq.

Defendant appeared in person and by counsel,

Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and Richard L. Peel, Esq.
presented a Stipulation to the Court.

The parties

The Court proceeded to

hear the matter on its merits and now enters the following:

1
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that Plaintiff meets the residency

requirements of the divorce statutes of the State of Utah.
2.

The Court finds that the parties have experienced

irreconcilable differences, such that Plaintiff should be awarded
a decree of divorce.
3.

The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant were

married for fewer than three years.

From the day they were

married, July 1, 1988, to the date of their final separation,
December 1, 1990, the parties were only married for twenty-nine
months.

Of the twenty-nine month marriage, the parties

experienced a brief trial separation of five months.
4.

The Court finds that at the time of their marriage,

Plaintiff was 47 years old and Defendant was 5 6 years old.
was Plaintiff's third marriage and Defendant's second.

This

No

children were born into the marriage.
5.

The Court finds that in 1966, Defendant built a house

at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah, 84058.

Defendant raised nine

children in this house and paid off a twenty year VA mortgage
sometime in 1987. At the time of the parties' marriage, July 1,
1988, the property was unencumbered by mortgage or lien.

2
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6.

The Court finds that prior to the parties' marriage,

Plaintiff sold her separate residence against the advise of
Defendant, and her brother-in-law, an accountant.

From the

$21,000 proceeds of the that sale, Plaintiff repaid her parents
the $18,000 she had borrowed from them to purchase the home.
7.

The Court finds that prior to the marriage, Plaintiff

had a net worth of $74,000.

Plaintiff's $74,000 net worth

included the $18,000 she repaid to her parents. The Court finds
that Defendant had a net worth.of $3 68,000.
8.

The Court finds that prior to the marriage, the parties

executed an Antenuptial Agreement.

Plaintiff executed the

Antenuptial Agreement on June 28, 1988 and Defendant executed the
Antenuptial Agreement on June 30, 1988.

Defendant intended for

his premarital assets, including his personal home, to be
protected under the provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement, and
Plaintiff had knowledge of Defendant's intent to protect his
personal home.

Under the provisions of the Antenuptial

Agreement, the parties contractually retained the right to
dispose of their separate property by commingling such assets or
otherwise.
9.

The Court finds that nearly contemporaneous with the

parties' signing of the Antenuptial Agreement, Defendant executed
3
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a Warranty Deed granting Plaintiff a joint interest in his
premarital home.
10.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's attorney in 1988, Doug

Nielsen, advised and counseled the parties regarding the
execution of the Antenuptial Agreement and Warranty Deed. Mr.
Nielsen drafted the Antenuptial Agreement and Warranty Deed.
Defendant's attorney, Phil Ivie, was not present at any of the
meetings held between the parties and Mr. Nielsen.

Mr. Nielsen

did not send the Warranty Deed^to Mr. Ivie, for his review, nor
did Mr. Nielsen speak with Mr. Ivie at any time regarding the
Warranty Deed.
11.

The Court finds that the provisions of the Warranty

Deed are patently incompatible with the protection provision of
the Antenuptial Agreement.

The Antenuptial Agreement was clearly

intended by the parties to protect their separate property.

That

is precisely why they sought the services of an attorney.
Clearly, the Warranty Deed was an afterthought by the parties.
12.

The Court finds the value of Defendant's home prior to

marriage and prior to the remodeling was $77,000.00.

The Court

finds that Plaintiff expended $18,062.65 for remodeling of
Defendant's premarital home (of this amount $9,005.55 was spent
by Plaintiff prior to the marriage and prior to the execution of
4
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the Antenuptial Agreement).

The Court finds that Plaintiff

received $5,500 from Defendant as reimbursement of the amounts
expended by her.

The Court finds that Plaintiff expended

$12,562.65 and that Defendant spent $11,931.00 on the remodeling.
13.

The Court finds that the fair market value of

Defendant's premarital home at the time of the parties'
separation was $105,000.00.

Defendant's premarital home did not

increase in value as a result of Plaintiff's remodeling
expenditures.

The value of Defendant's premarital home in 198 8

plus the amount of monies the parties paid toward the remodeling
or $106,993.65, exceeds the $105,000 fair market value of the
home.
14.

The Court finds that both parties liquidated separate

assets and invested them in the marriage.

The Court finds

Plaintiff expended $74,000.00 during marriage, of which Plaintiff
paid in excess of $3 0,000 to her children.

The Court finds

Defendant expended $109,114.45 during the marriage.
15.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's net worth at the time

of separation was $10,539.00 and Defendant's net worth at the
time of separation was $232,249.

Plaintiff's net decrease was

$63,461 and Defendant's net decrease was $135,709.

5
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16.

The Court finds that the parties should be awarded the

personal property as it has been divided between the parties.
The Court finds that Defendant should pay the remaining debt owed
to Zion/s First National Bank, which was incurred in February,
1989; the proceeds of which were used for the acquisition of
personal property.
17.

The Court finds that expenditures made by either party

prior to the marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the remodeling
costs), or after the separation date, December 1, 1990, are not
claimed, at issue, or reimbursable.
18.

The Court finds that Defendant paid to Plaintiff

$10,725.00 during the marital period.

This amount includes the

$5,500 amount Defendant paid to Plaintiff to reimburse her for
her remodeling costs.
19.

The Court finds that Plaintiff's current gross monthly

income is $1,850.00 and Defendant's current gross monthly income
from unemployment compensation is $554.00 per month.

Defendant's

historical income is irrelevant because of his sale of his
business and because his physical disability precludes him from
seeking full-time employment in his area of training; autobody
repair.

6
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20.

The Court finds that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant

are able to meet their respective financial obligations.

Both

parties suffered significant financial reversals during the very
short marriage and Defendant's ability to pay alimony is clearly
lacking.
21.

The Court finds that Defendant proffered a $24,000

Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff on or about August 12, 1992, which
Plaintiff declined to accept.

Subsequent to August 12, 1992,

Defendant incurred $4,649 in attorneys fees and costs.
22.

The Court finds that Defendant should be awarded all

right, title and interest in all real property he brought into
the marriage, including his premarital home and other personal
properties not otherwise awarded to Plaintiff.
23.

The Court finds that Plaintiff should be awarded all

rights, title and interest she has in and to her retirement.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff should be awarded a decree of divorce from

and against Defendant, the same to become final and absolute upon
signing by the Court and entry by the Clerk in the Registry of
Actions.
7
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2.

Plaintiff should be awarded the personal property she

presently has in her possession.

Defendant should be awarded the

personal property he presently has in his possession.
3.

Defendant should be ordered to pay the debt owing to

Zion's First National Bank, which was incurred in February of
1989.

Each party should be ordered to pay all debts he or she

incurred prior to their marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the
remodeling costs) or after the separation date of 12/1/90 (but
for Defendant's attorneys fees. and costs incurred subsequent to
8/12/92).
4.

Defendant should be ordered to reimburse Plaintiff for

her pre-marriage and post marriage expenditures for remodeling
Defendant's premarital home, located at 773 South 400 East, Orem,
Utah, in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65.
5.

Defendant should be awarded legal title and possession

of all real property he brought into the marriage, including his
personal home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah and all
personal property not otherwise awarded to Plaintiff.
6.

Plaintiff should be ordered to immediately reconvey to

Defendant by quit claim deed, title to Defendant's premarital
home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah.

8
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7.

Plaintiff should be awarded all rights, title and

interest she has in her retirement and savings,
8.

Plaintiff is not entitled to alimony.

9.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant's

attorneys fees and costs incurred subsequent to August 12, 1992
in the amount of $4,649; $2,3 60 for the legal services of Richard
L. Peel, Esq,, and $2,289 for legal services rendered by Marilyn
Moody Brown, Esq.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to restoration of her maiden

name.
Let a decree be entered accordingly.
DATED this &Zc£? day of October, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

district

Court

Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

~£aJrep4Eii

9

207

<rlp\cox\px> cox.ff 10/09/92

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Gary
Weight, Esq., attorney for Plaintiff, at Aldridge, Nelson, Weight
& Esplin, Post Office Box L, Provo, Utah 84603 this

day of

October, 1992.
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MARILYN MOODY BROWN, ESQ. #4803
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN
80 North 100 East
P.O. BOX 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
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RICHARD L. PEEL, ESQ.
Nevada State Bar #4359
228 S. Fourth Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101
Telephone: (702) 382-0711
Attorneys for Defendant K. NORMAN COX

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JANET R. COX,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil NO. 904402060

K. NORMAN COX,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court for trial on August 31,
1992.

The Plaintiff appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H.

Weight, Esq.

The Defendant appeared in person and by counsel,

Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and Richard L. Peel, Esq.
presented a Stipulation to the Court.

The parties

The Court proceeded to

hear the matter on its merits and having heretofore entered its

-

i

-
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters the
following:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from and

against the Defendant, the same to become final and absolute upon
signing by the Court and entry of the Clerk in the Registry of
Actions.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded the personal property she

presently has in her possession.
3.

Defendant is awarded the personal property he presently

has in his possession.
4.

Defendant is ordered to pay the debt owing to Zion's

First National Bank, which was incurred in February of 1989.
Each party is ordered to pay his or her own debts incurred prior
to the marriage, July 1, 1988 (but for the remodeling costs), or
after the separation date, December 1, 199 0.
5.

Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff within sixty (60)

days from the date of this decree, Plaintiff's pre-marriage and
post marriage remodeling expenditures, in the stipulated amount
of $12,562.65.
6.

Defendant is awarded all real property which he brought

into the marriage, including his personal home located at 773
- 2 -
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South 400 East, Orem, Utah, and all personal property not
otherwise awarded to Plaintiff herein.
7.

Plaintiff is ordered to immediately reconvey to

Defendant by quit claim deed, title to Defendant's premarital
home located at 773 South 400 East, Orem, Utah.
8.

Plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest she

has in her retirement and savings.
9.

Plaintiff's claim to alimony is denied.

10.

Plaintiff is ordered^to pay within sixty (60) days of

the date of this Decree, Defendant's attorneys fees and costs
incurred subsequent to August 12, 1992, in the amount of $2,360
to Richard Peel, Esq., and $2,289 to Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq.
Defendant may at his option and by permission of his attorneys,
deduct such attorneys fees and costs from the $12,562 he is
ordered to pay Plaintiff.
Let a decree be entered accordingly.
DATED this

£3

day of October, 1992.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

JANET R. COX,

DECISION

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 904402060
K. NORMAN COX,
Defendant.

Judge Lynn W. Davis

This matter came before the court for trial on August 31, 1992. The plaintiff
appeared in person and by counsel, Gary H. Weight, Esq. The defendant appeared in person
and by counsel, Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq., and Richard Peel, Esq. The parties presented
a stipulation and made opening arguments. At issue was (1) the award of alimony, (2) the
fair and equitable division of assets and (3) the award of attorney's fees. Evidence was taken
and the matter was taken under advisement. The court received a supplemental
memorandum from defendant and both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. This court has fully considered the evidence, memoranda submitted by
counsel and oral argument.
The court, being fully advised in the premises, now enters its:

1
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RULING
I. ALIMONY
Plaintiff seeks alimony in this case. The court will consider three factors in
determining an award of alimony: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Burt v. Burt. 799
P.2d 1166 (Ut.App. 1990).
A.

Facts.

In this case, the defendant sold his business after the separation of the parties. He
had some employment with Utah Valley Community College but has not been able to renew
his contract. He presently receives temporary unemployment compensation of $554.00 per
month and is seeking gainful employment. Those unemployment benefits commenced the
second week of July and will continue for twenty-six weeks. His historical earnings prove to
be $1,457.00 per month and his earnings at UVCC were $17.65 per hour for approximately
15 hours per week. In addition, he receives $500.00 per month from the sale of his
business. He suffers from a physical disability, necessitating knee operations. He cannot
afford the operation which, if performed, would lay him up for six months. He borrows
between $500.00 to $600.00 per month from his children in order to meet his financial
obligations.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, earns $1,850.00 gross income and receives $1,134.00 net
2

income after deductions for taxes and retirement and savings accounts. Even the plaintiff
recognizes that the present circumstances of the parties do not seem to compel an award of
alimony to the plaintiff. The defendant's ability to pay alimony is clearly lacking at the
present time. His historical earnings are not relevant because of his sale of his business and
because his physical disability now precludes him from seeking jobs in his area of training;
autobody repair.
It is important to note that plaintiff has enrolled in an Executive Masters Program in
Public Administration through Brigham Young University. That executive program is
conducted at night and will not interfere with her employment status. Brigham Young
University will pay plaintiffs full tuition, but not associated costs.
It is clear from the evidence that neither party now is able to meet respective financial
obligations. The plaintiff, since separation, has purchased a condominium and encumbered
herself with a mortgage. Defendant has sold off numerous personal items, a gun collection,
snowmobiles, cars, etc in attempting to finance the marriage. He also assumed new loans
during the marriage. Most marketable personal items have been sold.
B.

Decision

Applying the factors in Burt v. Burt, it is clear that the financial conditions and needs
of both parties are deplorable. The plaintiff has enrolled in a tuition-paid graduate program
with the hopes of bettering her financial position. Defendant currently has no such
opportunity. Defendant has no current employment and because of physical disabilities, no
3

reasonably foreseeable ability to obtain employment and to pay alimony. The marriage is of
a very short duration and both parties suffered significant financial reversals during the
marriage. Accordingly, no alimony award is merited.
E. PROPERTY DIVISION
A.

Facts

The parties married on July 1, 1988, in South Jordan, Utah. At marriage, plaintiff
was 47 years old and defendant was 56 years old. Their marriage was the third for the
plaintiff and second for the defendant. There were no children as issue of the marriage.
The marriage is of short duration (29 montfis), including a 5 month trial separation.
The financial declarations of both parties support the fact that this marriage was a financial
disaster for both parties.
The parties stipulated to various facts which affect property settlement matters and the
court adopts the following:
1.

Remodeling costs. The amount spent on remodeling by plaintiff was a total of

$18,062.65 (of this amount $9,005.55 was spent by plaintiff in remodeling prior to the
marriage and prior to the execution of the antenuptial agreement). Plaintiff received $5,500
from defendant as reimbursement of the amounts expended by her. Plaintiff spent
$12,562,65 for remodeling. Defendant spent approximately $11,931 on remodeling.
Remodeling was completed in order to accommodate the combination of the two families.
2.

Personal property. The personal property will be awarded to the parties as it
4

has been divided. Defendant will assume the debt to Zion's First National Bank which was
incurred in February, 1989 by the parties and was used for the acquisition of the personal
property. Each party will pay all other debts he or she incurred after the separation date of
12/1/90.
3.

Expenditures prior to marriage and post separation. Expenditures made by

either party prior to the marriage (but for the remodeling costs) or after the separation date
(December 1, 1990), are not claimed, at issue, or reimbursable.
4.

Value of separate property. The parties stipulate that the actual amounts that

should have been inserted in the antenuptial agreement for Norman Cox should have
been$368,000 and the amount that should have been inserted in the antenuptial agreement for
Janet Cox was $74,000.
5.

Net worth of parties at time of separation. (The court chooses to accept the

appraisal of Timothy Campbell). Plaintiffs net worth at time of separation was $10,539.
Defendant's net worth at time of separation was $232,249. The plaintiffs net decrease was
$63,461. The defendant's net decrease is $135,709.
6.

Amount of cash given by defendant to plaintiff. The amount of cash paid to

the plaintiff during the marital period by the defendant was $10,725 (inclusive of
reimbursement of remodeling costs).
7.

Expenditures by the parties. Plaintiffs expenditures during the marriage was

$74,000. Additionally, plaintiff gave to her children $24,000. The total amount that
5

plaintiff paid to her children by check (some of which is included above) is $31,284.15.
Defendant's expenditures during the marriage were $109,114.45.
8.

Current income. Plaintiffs current gross income is $1,850.00 per month.

Defendant's current unemployment compensation is $554.00 per month. The defendant's
historical income is $1457.00 per month.
9.

Cabin and retirement benefits. The plaintiff waives her claim for an interest in

defendant's cabin. The defendant waives his claim for an interest in plaintiffs retirement or
any other property belonging to plaintiff. The plaintiff waives any interest in defendant's
business or proceeds from the sale of business or any other property belonging to defendant.
Prior to marriage, the parties executed an antenuptial agreement and the defendant
intended for his premarital assets, including his personal home, to be protected under the
provisions of the antenuptial agreement. The plaintiff had knowledge of defendant's intent to
protect his personal home. The agreement was executed on June 30, 1988, two days prior to
the marriage. Nearly contemporaneous with the signing of the prenuptial agreement, (June
29, 1988), defendant executed a warranty deed granting plaintiff a joint interest in his
premarital home.
The protection provision of the antenuptial agreement is patently incompatible with
the provisions of the deed. Plaintiffs attorney in 1988, Doug Nielsen, advised and
counseled the parties regarding the execution of the antenuptial agreement and warranty
deed. Mr. Nielsen drafted the antenuptial agreement and the warranty deed. Defendant's
6

attorney, Phil Ivie, was not present at any of the meetings held between the parties and Mr.
Nielsen. Mr. Nielsen did not send the warranty deed to Mr. Ivie for his review, nor did Mr.
Nielsen speak with Mr. Ivie at any time regarding the warranty deed. It is unclear from the
disparate testimony of the witnesses whether defendant was confused, or whether he truly
intended to grant a joint interest to the plaintiff, irrespective of the mutually acknowledged
protection provision of the antenuptial agreement.
The defendant built the subject house in 1966, raised nine children there, and paid off
his twenty year VA mortgage sometime in 1987. At the time of the marriage of the parties
in 1988, the property was unencumbered by mortgage or lien.
The value of the residence at separation was disputed, and the court accepts the more
professional appraisal of Mr. Timothy Campbell which established the value at $105,000.00.
There is no dispute that the value of the subject premises at the time of the marriage was
$77,000.00.
Just prior to the marriage, plaintiff sold her separate residence. There is evidence
that plaintiffs brother, an accountant, and the defendant both advised her to keep the home.
From the proceeds of that sale, plaintiff paid her parents $18,000.00. They, evidently had
loaned her money to purchase the premises. While it is true that plaintiff liquidated her
home in anticipation of the marriage, it is also true that she had little equity in that home.
At closing she received $21,000.00, $18,000.00 of which was immediately paid to her
parents. It appears that plaintiffs net worth at the time she executed the prenuptial
7

agreement, $74,000, included the $18,000.00 which she repaid to her parents. Plaintiff
expended approximately $74,000.00 during the marriage. She liquidated some assets and
approximately $30,000.00 was given directly to her children during the marriage. In light of
the above, plaintiffs argument of detrimental reliance appears to lack foundation.
B.

DISCUSSION

The stipulation resolves all property disputes except for a consideration of the division
of defendant's premarital home. The prenuptial agreement protects defendant's interest and
the warranty deed purports to convey a one half interest to plaintiff. Article I of the
antenuptial agreement provides that each party's separate property and the proceeds thereof
would remain separate.
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a one half interest in the defendant's premarital
home. Defendant argues that plaintiff is only entitled to reimbursement for her pre and post
marriage remodeling cost, and any accrued valued. This court is more persuaded by
defendant's argument. The court adopts the following reasoning of defendant.
Utah court have held that disposition of property under an antenuptial agreement is
valid as long as there is no fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure. D'Aston v. D'Aston.
808 P.2d 111 (Ut.App. 1990); Berman v. Berman. 749 P.2d 1271 (Ut.App. 1988). The
antenuptial agreement the plaintiff executed on June 28, 1988, was validly executed and was
not subject to fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure. The parties entered into the
agreement upon plaintiffs request, her attorney drafted the agreement, the parties were
8

competent, the agreement was duly signed and notarized, and as consideration therefore both
parties, separate property was protected. Additionally, plaintiffs own attorney signed the
agreement and certified that he consulted with plaintiff and advised her of her property rights
and the legal significance of the antenuptial agreement.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that under the terms of an antenuptial agreement
where each party has relinquished all rights to previously acquired property of the other
party, he or she has no right to the other party's separate property nor any increase in value
that might accrue to that property. Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 78 (Ut.App. 1991);
Berman. 749 P.2d at 1271.l
To date, Utah courts have not directly addressed the question of whether a warranty
deed with rights of survivorship executed subsequent to an antenuptial agreement abrogates
the terms and provisions of the antenuptial agreement. However, other jurisdictions have

lr

rhe Rudman court held that , under the parties antenuptial
agreement, the husband's premarital property together with any
increase would remain the property of the husband, in spite of
the fact that the wife contributed labor and/or assets to the
property during marriage. Rudman, 812 P.2d at 78. In Berman,
the court overturned the lower court's order awarding the wife
one-half the equity in the husband's separate property home
purchased prior to marriage. The Berman court held that the
antenuptial agreement preserved the husband's house as his
separate property. The court based its reversal on evidence
presented at trial wherein the wife knowingly and voluntarily
entered the antenuptial agreement, no fraud or undue influence
induced the wife to sign the agreement and the agreement stated
that real property owned by the parties at the time of marriage
was to remain the separate property of each spouse. Berman, 749
P.2d at 1271.
9

1 ('

confronted this very issue. In Peet v. Monger. 56 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1953), the parties
entered into an antenuptial agreement prior to their marriage. Subsequent to the parties'
execution of the antenuptial agreement, the wife executed a joint tenancy deed which
contained no language expressly affecting the cancellation of the antenuptial agreement. The
Iowa Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision by finding that, under the antenuptial
agreement, the husband had no interest in or control over the joint tenancy property unless he
survived the wife. See also In Re Marriage of Van Brocklin. 468 N.W.2d 40 (Iowa App.
1991).
In the case at hand, the warranty deed with rights of survivorship is void of language
expressly canceling the antenuptial agreement. In fact, the deed expressly states that the
deed is subject to all "existing covenants of whatever nature." Additionally, the antenuptial
agreement existed at the time the warranty deed was executed and plaintiff had knowledge
that the antenuptial agreement she executed on June 28, 1988 attempted to control and
preserve the same property covered by the warranty deed.
Plaintiff next argues that the antenuptial agreement was abrogated when the parties
liquidated and expended their separate property in support of the marriage. This argument is
baseless. Recital "E" of the antenuptial agreement expressly provides:
Each of the parties mutually desires to retain, manage or dispose separately by
gift, will or otherwise all of his or her estate to the same extent as if each of
such parties remained single.
Clearly, by executing the antenuptial agreement, the parties contractually retained the right to
10

dispose of their separate property by commingling such assets or otherwise.2
Accordingly, the antenuptial agreement was not abrogated as to defendant's separate
property which was not commingled or liquidated, and these assets are still protected under
the provisions of the antenuptial agreement.
The Utah Supreme Court has held on several occasions that a trial court is not bound
by the state of title to real property prior to the issuance of a divorce decree. Georgedes v.
Georgedes. 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1981); Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah
1980); Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980); Lundgreen v. Lundgreen.
184 P.2d 670 (Utah 1947). A trial court is empowered to make distributions as are just and
equitable and may compel such conveyances as are necessary to that end. Jackson. 617 P.2d
at 341.
In upholding the lower court's decision in Georgedes. 627 P.2d at 45, the Utah
Supreme Court held that it was equitable to return to the husband a home and business which
he had brought into the marriage, notwithstanding that title had been placed in joint tenancy.
According to the Georgedes court, the trial court's decree simply put the parties to a second

2

In Burt v, Burt. 799 P.2d 1166 (Ut.App. 1990), the Utah
Court of Appeals held that separate property loses its separate
character when the marital parties have inextricably commingled
the separate property with marital property or when they have
contributed all or part of the separate property to the marital
estate. See also Rudman, 812 P.2d at 78. The analysis of both
the Rudman and the Burt courts clearly indicates that separate
property may be transmuted by the parties into marital property
if such property cannot be traced to a separate property source.
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marriage of relatively short real duration back into sole ownership of the properties they
brought into the marriage. Id. at 45.
In upholding the lower court's decision in Jesperson. 610 P.2d at 328, the Utah
Supreme Court held that where the wife had used her separate property to purchase a mobile
home during marriage and even though the mobile home was held in joint tenancy and
substantially improved by the husband's labors, it was equitable for the lower court to award
her an amount equal to the value of the assets she brought into the marriage.
And, in a case which is factually similar to the case at hand, the Utah Supreme Court
in Lundgreen. held that a wife was only entitled to receive one-half the market value in
excess of the original purchase price of a home purchased during marriage with the
husband's separate assets, even though the home was held in joint tenancy and the wife had
contributed extensive labor and separate funds in remodeling the home. 184 P.2d at 672.3
In arguing that she is entitled to one-half the value of defendant's separate property
home, plaintiff relies on Hogue v. Hogue 831 P.2d 121 (Ut.App. 1992). In Hogue, the sole
issue before the Utah Court of Appeals was whether a grantor spouse who conveyed his

3

A common factual theme exists in the Georcredes, Jesperson
and Lundareen cases and the case at hand. In each situation, the
parties were married for less than seven years, no children were
born into the marriage, both parties had been married before, one
of the parties either brought a premarital home into the marriage
or the home was purchased with that party7s separate funds, title
to the home was placed in joint tenancy within the first year of
marriage, and the other party allegedly contributed labor, income
and/or assets to remodel or improve the realty.
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entire interest in his separately owned real property, was entitled to a one-half interest in the
property upon the parties divorce. Plaintiffs reliance upon Hogue is misplaced.
The Hogue case is factually distinguishable from the facts of the Georgedes. Jesperson
and Lundgreen cases and the case at hand. In Hogue. the parties had been married for an
unspecified period of time, were divorced, then remarried. Subsequent to their remarriage,
In fact, Mr. Hogue transferred his entire interest in real property to his wife, as a means of
protecting the property from his judgment creditors. Unlike the case at hand, there was no
prenuptial agreement. The parties contracted for the purchase of additional acreage adjoining
the real property. The parties cohabitated together on the property prior to being remarried,
and the parties' second marriage lasted for over seven years. Lastly, the facts do not
indicate whether Mr. Hogue had asked the trial court for anything more than a one-half
interest in the property.
Utah courts have held that upon divorce, each party should retain the separate
property he or she brought into the marriage. Dunn v. Dunn. 802 ).2d 1314 (Ut.App.
1990). In making a property division, a trial court should take into consideration all the
pertinent circumstances of the parties' marriage. Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431,
432 (Utah 1982); Jackson. 617 P.2d at 338; English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).
The pertinent circumstances this court must consider are: (1) the duration of the
marriage; (2) the parties' ages at time of marriage and whether any children were born into
the marriage; (3) the amount and kind of property to be divided, whether the property was
13

acquired before or during the marriage, and the source of the property; (4) the parties'
standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs and earning capacity; and (5) the
health of the parties. Hogue, 831 P.2d 120 (Ut.App. 1992).
The court notes the following facts. First, the parties were married for fewer than
three years. From the day they were married, July 1, 1988, to the date of their final
separation, December 1, 1990, the parties were only married for twenty-nine months.
Additionally, during this twenty-nine month period the parties experienced a brief trial
separation of five months.
Second, plaintiff was 47 years old and defendant was 56 upon their marriage. The
marriage was plaintiffs third marriage and was defendant's second marriage. No children
were born into the marriage.
Third, the amount which plaintiff is seeking to obtain, $52,500 (one-half the value of
her 1990 appraisal on the home), substantially exceeds the monies she paid toward the
remodeling of the home, $12,500. This court takes into consideration the fact that defendant
has owned the property in question since 1966, and that at the time of marriage, the home
was free and clear of all encumbrances and liens.
The home has special meaning to defendant since he has raised all nine of his children
in the home. If this court were to award plaintiff one-half the value of the home, defendant
would be forced to sell the home to reimburse plaintiff since he is unemployed.
Fourth, defendant is not in the same financial situation as he was prior to marriage.
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Due to a slowdown in his business and because of his deteriorating health, defendant was
forced to sell his business. Defendant is currently unemployed and is looking for work. On
the other hand, Plaintiff has been employed at all times relevant hereto at Brigham Young
University. Due to her younger age and higher salary, plaintiff has an opportunity to recoup
some of her losses while defendant's age and health may prevent him from securing steady
full-time employment. Plaintiffs wages have steadily increased during the marriage with
reasonable expectation that they will continue to do so.
Fifth, both parties liquidated substantial sums of their separate property assets and
incurred substantial debts and obligations during the marriage. While plaintiff may have
spent considerable sums during the marital period and incurred substantial debts an
obligations, not all her expenditures or debts went to the marital estate. In 1989, plaintiff
sold her major asset, the Monroe property. She immediately dispersed $24,000 to her
children. This dispersement constituted the most significant reduction of her net worth
during the marriage.
It appears that the deed was also drafted and executed with some haste. The parties
were to married only three days after defendant executed the deed. The question that comes
to mind is why would the parties execute two completely conflicting documents unless one
was not anticipated or planned for by the parties? The antenuptial agreement was clearly
intended by the parties to protect their separate property. That is precisely why they sought
the services of an attorney. On the other hand, the warranty deed divested defendant of
15

fifty-percent of his ownership interest in his home. Clearly, the warranty deed was an
afterthought by the parties.
From the testimony of Mr. Nielson, counsel for plaintiff, it is not clear that he sent a
copy of the subject deed to Ray Ivie, counsel for defendant, for his review. This fact seems
to be substantiated by dates and notary acknowledgements of defendant's signature on the
warranty deed and the antenuptial agreement. Defendant's June 29, 1988, signature on both
the warranty deed and affidavit of surviving joint tenant was acknowledged by Mr. Nielson's
notary, Cynthia Shumway, while defendant's June 30, 1988 signature on the antenuptial
agreement was acknowledge by Ivie & Young's notary, Lois Pinster. If the deed had been
sent over to Ivie & Young for their review, prior to the deed's execution, defendant's
signature would have been most likely notarized by Ivie & Young's notary as well.
Under the rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in Georgedes. Jesperson and
Lundgreen where one of the parties contributes separate property assets to remodel or
improve a home brought into the marriage by the other spouse, and title to the home is
placed in joint tenancy within the first year of marriage, it is equitable to return to the spouse
who contributed their separate property assets to remodel or improve the premarital house
that spouses actual remodeling expenditures plus one-half of the increase in value to the
property is such increase exists.
In the case at hand, the parties have stipulated that the value of defendant's premarital
home in 1988, prior to the marriage and any improvements was $77,0000. The court has
16

found that the home's value was $105,000.00 upon the parties separation on December 1,
1990. The parties stipulated that plaintiff contributed $12,562. 65 toward the remodeling of
defendant's home and that defendant expended $11,931.00 on the remodeling. In addition,
defendant reimbursed plaintiff $5,550.00 for remodeling costs.
Based on the foregoing, even though the court has determined that the value of
Defendant's premarital home upon the parties final separation was $105,000.00, this court
finds that the home did not increase in value since the value of defendant's premarital home
in 1988 plus the amount of monies the parties paid toward the remodeling or $106,993.65,
exceeds the $105,000 appraised value of the home.4
C

DECISION ON DIVISION OF PROPERTY

Plaintiff is not entitled to one-half of defendant's interest in the home and plaintiff has
no life estate. Taking into consideration all of the pertinent circumstances, it is just and
equitable that plaintiff convey title to the subject property to defendant.
Plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for her actual pre-marriage and post marriage
expenditures for remodeling in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65. The balance of the

4

+

$77,000
$12,562.65

+

$5,500

+

$11,931

[value of home in 1988]
[value of plaintiffs remodeling
expenditures]
[amount defendant reimbursed plaintiff
for remodeling]
[value of defendant's remodeling
expenditures]

$106,993.65
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issues respecting personal property division and financial obligations are resolved by the
stipulation and appear just and equitable.
m. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant proffered an
offer of judgment to plaintiff of $24,000.00 on or about August 12, 1992. Since plaintiffs
judgment is not more favorable than defendant's $24,000.00 offer, plaintiff must pay
defendant's costs incurred after the making of the offer. Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq. and
Richard L. Peel, Esq., counsel for defendant, have submitted affidavits in support of
attorney's fees generated since August 12, 1992. The court finds the amount set forth to be
fair and reasonable under the circumstances; $2,360.00 for the legal services of Mr. Peel and
$2,289 for legal services rendered by Ms. Brown. Plaintiff is obligated to pay $4,649.00.
The court finds that both the plaintiff and defendant are in need of financial assistance
and, thereby, orders that each pay respective attorney's fees except as set forth above.
Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from and against the defendant, the same to
become final and absolute upon signing by the court and entry by the clerk in the Registry of
Actions. Plaintiff is also entitled to the restoration of her maiden name.
Counsel have submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
in connection with this case. Upon review, defendant's proposal most closely reflects the
ruling of the court except for the attorney's fee issue.
The court directs counsel for the defendant to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of
18

law and decree of divorce consistent with the foregoing decision of the Court and the
stipulation of the parties received at trial.
DATED AT PROVO, UTAH, this ^ f d a y of September, 1992.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

JANET R. COX,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 904402060
K. NORMAN COX,
Defendant.

Judge Lynn W. Davis

I hereby certify that I caused to mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the court's Decision on September 28, 1992, to the following:
Gary Weight, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
ALDRIDGE, NELSON, WEEGHT & ESPLIN
P.O. Box L
Provo, UT 84603
Marilyn Moody Brown, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 1266
Richard L. Peel, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
228 S. Fourth Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101
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MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
n,

JANET R. COX,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL^

-vs-

Civil No.

904402060

K. NORMAN COX,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

PLAINTIFF TO

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED

counsel of record, Mary
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Decree of

C.
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ACTION, by and through her
hereby

appeals

from the

the above-entitled action;

entered on or about October 28, 1992.
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1992.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

C. CORPORON
Attorney for Plaintiff
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APPENDIX "E"
Antenuptial Property Agreement

COff
ANTENUPTIAL PROPERTY AGREEMENT
Antenuptial Agreement made this
day of
19 £B , between KENNETH NORMAN COX, an adult, hereinafter
referred to as prospective husband, and JANET J. REX, an adult,
hereinafter referred to as prospective wife, in consideration of
the contemplated marriage of the above-named parties.
RECITALS
A. A marriage is intended and desired to be solemnized
between the parties hereto.
B. Each of the parties is possessed of property which they
separately own or have an interest in their own individual right.
C. Each of the parties has made a full disclosure to the
other party of all of his or her property and assets and of the
value thereof, and this Agreement is entered into with a full
knowledge on the part of each as to the extent and probable value
of the estate of the other, and of all the rights conferred by
law on each in the estate of the other by virtue of such proposed
marriage.
D. Intanticipation of such marriage the parties desire to
fix and determine the rights of each of them in any and all
property of every nature and description and wheresoever located
that the other of them may own or have an interest in at the time
of such marriage or may acquire thereafter.
E. Each of the parties mutually desires to retain, manage
or dispose separately by gift, will or otherwise all of his or
her estate to the same extent as if each of such parties remained
single.
In consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein,
the parties agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
Each of the parties hereto shall retain the title, management and control of the estates now owned by each of them,
whether real, personal or mixed, and all increase or addition
thereto, entirely free and unmolested by the other party and may
encumber, sell, dispose, give or provide by will for the disposition of any or all of such estates so separately owned and
possessed. At the death of either no claim by inheritance, descent, surviving spouse award, homestead, dower or maintenance
1

shall be made by either of the parties hereto against the other
or against the estate of the other.
ARTICLE II
Each of the parties hereto separately waives any and all
rights by dower, homestead, surviving spouse award, inheritance,
descent or any other marital right arising by virtue of statute
or otherwise in and to any parcel of the estate now owned and
possessed by the other, and does hereby agree and consent that
each shall have full power and control in all respects to exercise free and undisputed ownership, management and disposition of
each of such estates and increases thereto now owned and possessed by the parties, and each of such parties does waive and
renounce any legal and statutory rights that might, under any
law, be set up against any part of the estate of the other and
does consent that the estate of each shall descend or be disposed
of by will or otherwise to the heirs or legatees or devisees of
each of the parties, free and clear of any claim by inheritance,
dower, surviving spouse award or homestead or maintenance or any
claim otherwise given bylaw to a husband and wife.
ARTICLE III
This Agreement shall not in any manner, bar or affect, the
right of either party to claim and receive any property of any
nature or character that the other party hereto, by last will, or
by any other instrument, may give, devise, bequeath, transfer or
assign to the other party hereto.
ARTICLE IV
If either party shall mortgage, pledge, or sell and convey,
his or her real or personal estate, whether in whole or in part,
the other party hereto shall, upon demand, from time to time join
in any and every mortgage, or deed of conveyance, or in any other
instrument that.may be necessary or desirable to make the same
effectual.
ARTICLE V
In the event that at any time during the existence of the
marital relationship between the parties, they should be or
become residents of a state under the laws of which husband and
wife acquire property interests commonly known as community
property or any other property and interests different from the
property interests of husband and wife under the laws of the
State of Utah, their property interests shall nevertheless remain
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the same as they would have been under the terms of this agreement construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah,
and the parties will each, at any time during or after the termination of the marital relationship, execute and deliver any and
all deeds and other instruments desirable or necessary to transfer any right, title or interest, in any property or estate of
the other which they may acquire by virtue of any so-called
community property laws to the persons who would otherwise be
entitled thereto by virtue of this Agreement.
ARTICLE VI
If the prospective husband shall survive the prospective
wife, the prospective husband shall not. as surviving husband,
make any claim to any part, or share, of the real and/or personal
estate of which the prospective wife may die seized or possessed.
The prospective husband, in consideration of such marriage,
hereby expressly waives and relinquishes all right in and to the
real property of which the prospective wife may die seized, as
well as all right in and to the personal estate of the prospective wife, or a surviving husband, heir-at-law, or otherwise.
ARTICLE VII
If the prospective wife shall survive the prospective husband, she shall not, as surviving wife, make any claim to any
part, or share, of the real and/or personal estate of which the
prospective husband may die seized or possessed. The prospective
wife hereby waives and relinquishes all claims to an allowance,
homestead, widow's award, or any other right in and to the real
and/or personal estate of which the prospective husband may die
seized or possessed.
ARTICLE VIII
Neither party hereto, by virtue of such marriage, shall
have, or acquire, any right, title or claim in and to the real or
personal estate of the other, that the estate of each shall
descend to or vest in his or her, heirs-at-law, legatees, or
devisees, as may be prescribed by his or her last will and
testament, or in default of such last will and testament, by the
law then in force, as though no marriage had ever taken place
between the parties.
ARTICLE IX
This Agreement is entered into by the parties hereto with
full knowledge on the part of each of the extent and probable
3

value of all of the property or estate of the other, and of all
rights that, but for this Agreement, would be conferred by law
upon each of them in the property or estate of the other, by
virtue of the consummation of the proposed marriage, and the
rights of the respective parties hereto in and to each other's
property, or estate, of whatsoever character the same may be,
shall be determined, fixed and settled by this Agreement, and not
otherwise. Prospective husband represents that, on the date of
this Agreement, the approximate value of his property and assets
is THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS 380,000.00
).
Prospective wife represents that, on the date of this Agreement,
the approximate value of her property and assets is SEVENTY
THOUSAND AND NO/100 DPI LARS
($ 70.000.00
).
ARTICLE X
This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement between the
parties relating to their antenuptial property arrangements.
There are no oral Agreements between the parties respecting such
antenuptial property arrangements. Any alteration or modification of this Agreement must be in writing, signed and acknowledged by each of the parties hereto.
ARTICLE XI
This Agreement shall bind the parties hereto and their
respective heirs, administrators and assigns, and shall become
effective only upon the consummation of the proposed marriage
between the parties hereto, and if such marriage does not take
place, this Agreement shall be null and void.
ARTICLE XII
The parties hereto both stipulate that they, and each of
them, were represented by legal counsel of their choice in the
preparation of this Agreement; that they have read this Agreement
and have had its contents explained, and to each of them, by such
counsel; and that they fully understand the terms, provisions,
and legal consequences of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement
at Provo, Utah, the day and year first above written.

/KENNETH NORMAN/JCOX
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STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH

)

On
<jyx(\t30l \c\%<&
, personally appeared before me
KENNETH NORMAN COX, one of the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the,
p
•>..
same.
y - ^ '4/,y>,

'mil"

OTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing At:

STATE OF UTAH

"* ~'1*1
w\*••

H*l)V(\ \LMh

•'• A> /

'••, v

Or

)

ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH

)

June 28, 1988
personally appeared before me
On
JANET J. REX, one of the signers of the foregoing instrument, who
duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
August 14, 1991
Residing At:
Provo, Utah

/ y C/")o \ \
*0
r

<h
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•-IM'.

CATION OF ATTORNEY
_
certify that I am a licensed
id to practice law in the State of Utah; that I
have consulteaSwith KENNETH NORMAN COX, who is a party to the
foregoing Agreement, and that I have fully advised him of his
property rights and the legal significance of the foregoing
Agreement; and that KENNETH NORMAN COX has acknowledged his full
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and complete understanding of the legal consequences and of the
terms and provisions of the foregoing Agreement anc^. has freely
and voluntarily executed the Agreement in

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
:ss,
)

, personally appeared before me
_, Attorney at law, signer of the
above
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he exec^tied**^
e insti
%%%
the same.
' * 0l*
On

X\At

J f e p T A ^ «V \

1*1

NOTARY PUBLI
My Commission Expire,
Residing At:

Vtnrn;

"'••..mM* 1 '

CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY
I, DOUGLAS A. NIELSON, certify that I am a licensed
attorney, admitted to practice law in the State of Utah; that I
have consulted with JANET J. REX, who is a party to the foregoing
Agreement, and that I have fully advised her of her property
rights and the legal significance of the foregoing Agreement; and
that JANET J. REX has acknowledged her full and complete understanding of the legal consequences and of the terms and provisions of the foregoing Agreement and^fe^s freely and voluntarily
executed the Agreement in my presence

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

:ss.

On
June 28, 1988
, personally appeared before me
DOUGLAS A. NIELSON, Attorney at law, signer of the above*
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:
Residing At:
Provo. Utah

August 14, 1991
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I
WARRANTY DEED

NORMAN COX, grantor, hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to NORMAN
COX and JANET J. REX, as joint tenants with full rights of
survivor- ship and not as tenants in common, grantees, of 773
South 400 East, Orem, Utah, for the sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10.00)
and other valuable consideration, the following described real
property situated in Utah County, State of Utah:
Commencing in the intersection of the East Boundary of 400
East Street, Orem, Utah,m and the grantors South fence line
extended, said point being 207.90 feet North and 43.40 feet
East of the Center of Section 23, Township 6 Sourh, Range
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North along the
East boundary of said Street 66.00 feet; thence South 88*
55' East along a fence line extended and a fence line 241.35
feet to the grantors East fence line; thence South 0* 44'
West along said East fence line 65.50 feet to the said South
fence line; thence North 89* 02' West along said fence line
and fence line extended 241.00 feet to the point of beginning.
Together with all appurtenances thereunto belonging.
This deed is hereby made expressly subject to all existing
and recorded restrictions, exceptions, reservations, easements,
rights-of-way, conditions, liens, encumbrances, and covenants of
whatever nature, if any, and is expressly subject to all municipal, city, county, and state zoning laws and other ordinances,
regulations, and restrictions, including statutes and other laws
of municipal, county, or other governmental authorities applicable to and enforceable against the premises described herein.
WITNESS the hands of said grantors this / Y

day of

NORMAN COX

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH
On

)
: ss.
)
June 29, 1988

, personally appeared before

EXHIBIT *

•HT1S702
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me NORMAN COX, the signer of the within instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission E x p i r e s : August U, 1991
R e s i d i n g At:
Provo,, Utan
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO:
Douglas A. Nielson
3 319 North University Avenue, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
MAIL TAX NOTICE TO:
Grantees
773 South 400 East
Orem, Utah 84058
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AFFIDAVIT OF SURVIVING JOINT TENANT
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STATS OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH
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: ss.
)

NORMAN COX, of legal^ age, being duly sworn, deposes and
says:
That RUBY GURR DUKE COX, the decedent mentioned in the
attached certified copy of Certificate of Death, is the same
person as RUBY S. COX, named as one of the parties in that
certain Quit-Claim Deed dated November 6, 1967, executed by MARY
ANN DUKE, FENTON J. PRINCE and LILLIAN T. PRINCE, recorded as
Entry No. 7627, in Book 1117
Page
78
of official records
of Utah County, State of Utah, concerning the real property
situated in the County of Utah, State of Utah and described as
follows:
Commencing in the intersection of the East Boundary of 400
East Street, Orem, Utah, and the grantors South fence line
extended, said point being 207.90 feet North and 43.40 feet
East of the Center of Section 23, Township 6 South, Range
2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North along the
East boundary of said Street 66.00 feet; thence South 88*
55' East along a fence line extended and a fence line 241.85
feet to the grantors East fence line; thence South 0* 44'
West along said East fence line 65.50 feet to the said South
fence line; thence North 89* 02' West along said fence line
and fence line extended 241.00 feet to the point of beginning.
DATED this 4 -z*

J

day of

19 >T*

J

.£=
NORMAN COX
773 South 400 East
Orem, Utah 84053
Telephone: (801) 225-3731

STATE OF UTAH
: ss

COUNTY OF UTAH
On t h e
29th day of
19 88 ,
June
personally appeared before me NORMAN COX, the signer of the
within and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
he executed the same.

ENTi^TO 1

(j gMr \\jf(
Notaty Public
My Commission E x p i r e s :
August 14, 1991
Residing At:
Provo. man

BK 2 S 2 2 PS 7<? 1

X\\l^A<\li:

